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PENALTY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN DEPORTATION FOR 
CRIMES 
MAUREEN SWEENEY* AND HILLARY SCHOLTEN** 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 30, 2010, in the case of Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases includes the 
right for non-citizen defendants to receive accurate advice about the 
immigration consequences of any plea agreement.1  This holding proceeded 
from the Court’s prior conclusion that deportation which results from a 
criminal conviction is, as a matter of federal law, “an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”2  This 
acknowledgment of the extent to which deportation proceedings can be 
“enmeshed” with criminal convictions and, indeed, that deportation can be part 
of a criminal penalty,3 marks a sharp departure from the Court’s century-long 
characterization of immigration consequences as “purely civil”4 and opened 
the door, at least in the Padilla case, for the extension of a constitutional 
protection traditionally reserved to the criminal realm into the arena of 
immigration.  At the same time, it opened the door to arguments that other 
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nod to Justice Douglas’s dissent in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)). 
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 1. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted). 
 3. Id. at 1481. 
 4. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893). 
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constitutional protections should perhaps apply to immigrants facing 
deportation, especially those facing deportation as a consequence for crimes 
committed.5 
It remains to be seen, however, how far courts will go in working out the 
implications of the high Court’s statement and what additional protections, if 
any, may be found appropriate for individuals facing deportation.  The 
language and logic of Padilla arguably support the proposition that if 
deportation is part of a criminal penalty, other protections afforded criminal 
defendants should extend to removal proceedings and to the removal sanction, 
at least where these result directly from convictions.  Such protections might 
include prohibitions against the imposition of ex post facto laws, 
disproportionate penalties, or even a right to counsel in removal proceedings.6  
On the other hand, it is possible that courts will decline any invitation to extend 
the decision’s reach beyond its specific terms.  Padilla crossed the bright-line 
divide between civil and criminal characterizations of removal as a sanction for 
crime, but will it prove to be “the camel’s nose under the tent” that will 
completely overturn a century’s jurisprudence on deportation7 or will it end up 
being a high-water mark for protection of noncitizens? 
For purposes of this Article, we are taking the Padilla Court at its word 
that deportation triggered solely by a criminal conviction is a part of the 
penalty for the underlying criminal behavior, and we begin to explore the 
question of what other constitutional limits might be placed on the imposition 
 
 5. The decision has prompted a plethora of articles, trainings, and symposia on its possible 
implications.  See, e.g., other authors’ arguments presented in this issue, which were presented at 
Saint Louis University School of Law Symposium: A New Era for Plea Bargaining and 
Sentencing? The Aftermath of Padilla v. Kentucky (Feb. 25, 2011); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011); Derek Wikstrom, Note, “No 
Logical Stopping Point”: The Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky’s Inevitable Expansion, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1845815; Symposium, 
Crossing the Border: The Future of Immigration Law and Its Impact on Lawyers, 45 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 301 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical 
Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21 [hereinafter Chin & Love, Status as 
Punishment]; Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to 
Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 18 
[hereinafter Love & Chin, Right to Counsel and Collateral Consequences]; Kevin Ruser, Padilla 
v. Kentucky: “Crimmigration” Law Goes Constitutional, 13 NEB. LAW. 13 (2010). 
 6. As others have very persuasively argued, the decision also has important and potentially 
far-reaching implications for the imposition of other “collateral” consequences of convictions as 
well.  See, e.g., Love & Chin, Right to Counsel and Collateral Consequences, supra note 5, at 
22–23; Chin & Love, Status as Punishment, supra note 5, at 31.  Some courts have already begun 
to apply Padilla’s requirement of counsel to consequences other than deportation.  See, e.g., 
Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Padilla to a case 
involving involuntary commitment following sex offense conviction). 
 7. Markowitz, supra note 5, at 8. 
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of that punishment.8  We choose to begin the exploration of what possible 
criminal procedure protections might apply to criminal deportations by 
considering the principle, grounded in the Eighth Amendment,9 that a penalty 
should be proportionate to the crime it punishes.  The appropriateness of any 
given punishment is assessed in large part by how fitting it is to the crime 
committed, and the Eighth Amendment governs the boundaries of permissible 
punishment by forbidding punishment that is “cruel and unusual.”10  Within 
that prohibition, the Supreme Court has recognized that a punishment should 
be proportionate to the crime it punishes.11  This requirement of 
proportionality, diminished though it may be in modern application, is at the 
heart of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  The State must 
not enact a punishment more severe than is justified by the crime that was 
committed.  This proportionality principle is fundamental to our sense of just 
punishment.  Along with the prohibition against physical torture, the 
proportionality principle is one of the most essential limitations in preserving a 
sense of fairness in and the integrity of the criminal justice system, and in 
protecting the individual from overreaching by the coercive state.  It goes to 
the heart of both aspects of the special interests at stake in criminal 
proceedings—the liberty interests of the individual and the institutional 
integrity of the system through which punishment is imposed.12 
The proportionality principle is also wholly absent from our current law of 
deportation for crimes, which has been expanded and rigidified over the last 
two decades to the point that it now imposes automatic and irrevocable 
deportation for any so-called “aggravated felony.”13  This category imposes 
deportation equally for, among other offenses, murder, petty theft, aggravated 
rape, and failure to appear in court.14  Similarly, the sanction is the same 
 
 8. There are a number of other possible constitutionally-based protections.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI (the right to counsel); id. (the right to trial by jury); id. (the right to confront one’s 
accusers); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (the right to protection against ex post facto laws); U.S. CONST. 
amend. V (the right to protection against self-incrimination); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (the right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (the right to 
protection from impermissibly vague laws); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (the right to protection 
from cruel and unusual punishments, including disproportionate punishment). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 12. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (stating heightened protections for criminal 
defendant are justified both by the strong liberty interests of individual defendants and by 
society’s interest in the reliability and resulting moral force of the criminal justice system); see 
also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424−27 
(1979). 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). 
 14. Id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining the broad range of offenses which qualifies as an “aggravated 
felony”); see discussion infra Part II.B. 
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regardless of an individual’s history or connections in the community and 
applies equally to an undocumented individual who entered the country 
without permission yesterday and to a long-term lawful permanent resident 
who may have deep roots in the community, such as dependent U.S. citizen 
family members or honorable military service.15  Much of the sense of injustice 
that results from the operation of our current criminal deportation law comes 
from recognition of the blatant disproportion between the sanction of 
automatic deportation and the circumstances under which it is imposed. 
In addition to the centrality of proportion to our sense of just punishment, 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is an attractive place to begin exploring 
Padilla’s reach because the jurisprudence has already been extended to 
prohibit certain non-criminal sanctions where these were found to be penal in 
nature, even if not in name or explicit intent.16  The Court has held that the 
Amendment limits the government’s power to punish, even when the explicitly 
stated purpose of a statutory sanction is remedial, when the provision in fact 
serves—at least in part—the goals of punishment.17  This precedent means that 
Eighth Amendment analysis need not rely on a firm distinction between 
criminal and civil proceedings but can rather be based on the effective punitive 
purpose or function of a sanction.18  The Padilla Court’s statement that 
deportation for crimes is a penalty19 lends support to an Eighth Amendment 
analysis, even though it stops short of challenging the “civil” characterization 
of removal proceedings. 
Finally, in considering where first to inquire as we peek through the door 
Padilla opened, we have considered the fact that Eighth Amendment 
protections in the criminal realm have been severely weakened in recent 
 
 15. See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the 
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 338 (2000) 
(noting that “extremely compelling equities” are irrelevant under the current statutory scheme). 
 16. See id. at 319–25. 
 17. E.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993) (finding that civil forfeiture 
constitutes punishment and is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive 
Fines Clause); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–04 (1958) (plurality opinion) (finding a 
nominally non-penal provision imposing denationalization for desertion to be punishment and 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).  But 
see United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) (refusing to subject in rem civil forfeitures 
to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy). 
 18. See Pauw, supra note 15, at 321−24, and Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 (2009), for a discussion of the punitive nature of deportation and 
corresponding limits that could be placed on it pursuant to the Eighth and Fifth Amendment 
limitations on the imposition of punishment. 
 19. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010). 
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decades.20  In fact, this objection was raised by every criminal lawyer to whom 
we have mentioned this project: Why make the effort to come within the scope 
of such a toothless constitutional guarantee?  It is undeniable that while the 
principle of proportionality has been upheld, the Eighth Amendment has 
provided little concrete protection to defendants in the criminal realm for many 
years, as courts have proved willing to defer to virtually any sentencing policy 
decision made by a legislature, including mandatory minimum and recidivist 
sentencing schemes, no matter how absurd their results in individual cases.21 
In this context, the Court has been largely unwilling to overturn 
legislatures’ decisions about appropriate sentencing schemes out of strong 
deference to legislative expertise in policy-making.22  However, we argue that 
this deference should not be applied to criminal deportation law because this 
law was never considered by Congress as a sentencing policy, and courts, 
therefore, have room for a more robust review of the proportionality of 
deportation for any given crime or set of crimes.  We also take hope from the 
Court’s decision just last term, Graham v. Florida, in which it held that the 
punishment of life without the possibility of parole was cruel and unusual 
when imposed on a juvenile offender who commits a non-homicide crime.23  
The Graham Court was unwilling to defer to the majority of state legislatures 
which allowed such a sentence, finding that “the Court must determine in the 
exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in question 
violates the Constitution.”24  The holding and reasoning in Graham provide 
additional support for examining the constitutionality of deportation as a 
sanction for certain criminal violations. 
Ultimately, like other immigration practitioners, we recognize the 
epidemic of disproportionately harsh deportations being carried out in this 
country for relatively minor offenses25 and feel that even a relatively weak 
recognition that a penalty should be proportionate provides a better backstop 
than the current criminal removal scheme, which requires no proportionality 
whatsoever and, in the case of the vast number of “aggravated felonies,” 
actually prohibits an immigration judge or any other decision maker from 
 
 20. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment) (“Our decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 22. See id. at 24. 
 23. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 24. Id. at 2022 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)). 
 25. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, Paterson Pardons Six Immigrants Facing Deportation Over Old 
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A25 (describing crimes with disproportionately severe 
penalties). 
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exercising discretion in deciding whether to impose deportation.26  For these 
reasons, we have chosen to begin our exploration of possible post-Padilla 
extensions of constitutional safeguards with a look at the opportunities and 
challenges attendant in contesting certain crime-related deportations as 
disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
It should be noted that our piece is limited in scope.  For example, though 
we think it is a serious question, we will not address whether society, as 
represented by the government, has a strong enough interest in policing its 
borders and the content of its community to override constitutionally based 
protections for individuals (the plenary powers doctrine).  Heartened by 
Padilla’s willingness to rely on the constitutional rights of the individual, we 
leave that question for another day.  Neither will we address the question of 
whether it is desirable or appropriate, even if Padilla allows it, to extend 
criminal-style constitutional protections to deportation for crimes—we will 
assume that it is.  Finally, we will not spell out the details of what a litigation 
strategy or remedy in such a challenge to proportionality would look like. 
What the Article will do is propose a theoretical framework for 
understanding how current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can support the 
conclusion that deportation for certain crimes constitutes impermissibly cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Part I will summarize the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence  on cruel and unusual punishment, addressing the 
analysis the Court uses in two types of challenges.  Part II traces the history of 
the Supreme Court’s characterization of the law of deportation for crimes, the 
changes that law has undergone in recent decades, and the Court’s treatment of 
criminal deportation in Padilla v. Kentucky.  Finally, Part III will explain how 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should overlap with the law of criminal 
deportation to result in a robust review of proportionality in deportation. 
 
 26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting cancellation of removal for permanent 
residents convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1101(f)(8) (excluding persons convicted of an 
aggravated felony from being classified as a “person of good moral character”); id. § 
1229b(b)(1)(B) (limiting cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents to persons of good 
moral character); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.65(a) (2011) (prohibiting suspension of deportation for persons 
convicted of an aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (prohibiting voluntary departure for 
persons convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (limiting voluntary departure to 
persons of good moral character for five years prior to application); 8 C.F.R. § 1244.4 
(disqualifying persons convicted of any felony from temporary protected status).  Individuals 
convicted of aggravated felonies are even barred from some kinds of humanitarian relief, from 
persecution in the form of asylum, and in many circumstances, the more limited withholding of 
removal, as well.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (noting persons convicted of an aggravated 
felony are considered “to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime”); id. § 
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (prohibiting persons convicted of a particularly serious crime from obtaining 
asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (allowing removal to a country where life or freedom would be 
threatened if a person convicted of a particularly serious crime was determined to be a danger to 
the community). 
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I.  THE NATURE OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: A SUMMARY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S FINAL 
CLAUSE 
Since the passage of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
struggled to find a clear and succinct doctrine for determining what constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.  This struggle is due in part to the changing 
nature of punishment in this country.27  We no longer draw and quarter humans 
or burn them alive for committing certain crimes.  As our national attitudes 
regarding humane punishment change, so too does the reach of the Eighth 
Amendment.28 
The Court has also struggled to find a united approach in which to ground 
its interpretation of the Amendment.  On the one hand, the Court’s decisions 
have steadfastly maintained that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to 
the Eighth Amendment,”29 which embodies the “precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”30  
On the other hand, it has been deeply divided within those decisions, with 
Justices disagreeing on everything from the existence of such a concept or 
principle, to the role of the judiciary in making judgments about its application, 
to the scope of any constitutional guarantee in its application in a particular 
sentence.  The Court’s recent opinion in Graham v. Florida gave a good 
summary of the Court’s “closely divided” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
over the last few decades.31  The complex and fractured state of the analysis is 
illustrated by the fact that the current legal standard for individualized 
proportionality review was established in Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, a decision that included not only a majority 
 
 27. For example, barbaric punishment and torture were long ago recognized as cruel and 
unusual, but today there are still punishments that offend our modern standards of decency and 
are thus unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976) (“[T]he 
Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments.  The Amendment embodies 
‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against 
which we must evaluate penal measures. . . . These elementary principles establish the 
government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by 
incarceration.” (citations omitted)); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 
(1947) (plurality opinion) (“The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the 
infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence.”). 
 28. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (“The Amendment ‘draw[s] its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))). 
 29. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). 
 30. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). 
 31. Id. at 2021–22. 
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and concurring opinion but also three dissenting opinions.32  Graham itself 
consists of a majority opinion, two separate concurrences, and two dissents.33 
Despite these divisions in the Court, however, a jurisprudence has 
emerged.  The Court considers two types of challenges to the proportionality of 
a particular sentence.  The first type of challenge asks whether the imposition 
of any number of years of incarceration is excessive as compared with the 
crime that was committed.34  The Court “‘does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme 
sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.’”35  The second type 
Court considers is a challenge against a particular sentencing practice.36  This 
categorical challenge considers whether a sentence, every time it is applied a 
certain way, can ever be proportionate.37  While historically this kind of 
challenge has primarily been levied against the application of the death 
penalty, just last term in Graham, the Court entertained and upheld a 
categorical challenge to a non-death penalty sentence.38 
The Court’s analysis with each type of challenge is somewhat different, 
but in both, the overarching principle is to balance the severity of the 
individual’s crime with the severity of the punishment.39  In assessing the 
severity of the crime, the Court evaluates not only the circumstances of the 
offense but also the characteristics of the offender to determine if there is any 
increased or decreased moral culpability.  The characteristics of the offender 
can be relevant to his or her moral culpability and thus the appropriateness of a 
penalty: The Court has required a mitigation of severe penalties for those with 
diminished moral culpability, such as juveniles40 and individuals with 
intellectual disabilities,41 and has allowed increasingly severe punishments for 
those with increased moral culpability, such as repeat offenders.42 
 
 32. 501 U.S. 957, 998–1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
 33. 130 S. Ct. 2011. 
 34. Id. at 2021. 
 35. Id. at 2021 (quoting  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment)). 
 36. Id. at 2021. 
 37. Id. at 2022. 
 38. Id. at 2034. 
 39. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 40. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that capital punishment of 
individuals who were under eighteen at the time they committed their capital crime is prohibited 
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 41. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that executions of mentally 
retarded criminals were “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
 42. E.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76–77 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 
29–31 (2003) (plurality opinion); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284–85 (1980); Hutto v. 
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374–75 (1982) (per curiam). 
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Both types of analysis, however, are largely shaped by the Court’s deep 
deference to the enactments of the legislative branch, which it considers to be 
the proper branch to make sentencing policy decisions and to express societal 
values in sentencing.  Often, the Court is content to defer completely to the 
legislature’s weighing of the factors identified above.  The across-the-board 
importance of this legislative deference is striking given the divisions among 
Justices as to other principles of the jurisprudence.  As we explain, this 
legislative deference also plays an important role in thinking about how Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence might be applied to criminal deportation. 
A. Grossly Disproportionate Individual Sentences 
The extent to which the Court will allow the scales of justice to tip in favor 
of severe punishments and still find them to be proportional to the crime has 
arguably increased over the years.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Harmelin v. 
Michigan articulated the current standard for interpreting the proportionality of 
a term-of-years sentence as compared with the crime that was committed.43  In 
Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld Mr. Harmelin’s life sentence after he was 
convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.44  The life sentence was 
mandatory under Michigan law.45  It is Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
in the case that is controlling, which holds that the proportionality guarantee of 
cruel and unusual punishment is not extinct, as some contend, but that it is in 
fact “narrow.”46 
Justice Kennedy begins his opinion by recognizing that the Court’s 
analysis of Eighth Amendment issues is far from clear, but that there were 
some emergent guiding principles that were foundationally present in the 
majority of cases.47  These principles are as follows: 
Principle One: “[T]he fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a 
substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is ‘properly within 
the province of legislatures, not courts.’”48  Justice Kennedy recognized that 
whether sentencing is viewed as a moral or political issue, it provokes deeply 
 
 43. 501 U.S. at 998–1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 44. Id. at 961 (plurality opinion). 
 45. Id. at 961 n.1 (“Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1990-
1991) provides a mandatory sentence of life in prison for possession of 650 grams or more of 
‘any mixture containing [a schedule 2] controlled substance’; § 333.7214(a)(iv) defines cocaine 
as a schedule 2 controlled substance.  Section 791.234(4) provides eligibility for parole after 10 
years in prison, except for those convicted of either first-degree murder or ‘a major controlled 
substance offense’; § 791.233b[1](b) defines ‘major controlled substance offense’ as, inter alia, a 
violation of § 333.7403.”). 
 46. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 47. Id. at 998. 
 48. Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)). 
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conflicting ideas.49  He concluded that “[t]he efficacy of any sentencing system 
cannot be assessed absent agreement on the purposes and objectives of the 
penal system.  And the responsibility for making these fundamental choices 
and implementing them lies with the legislature.”50  Justice Kennedy’s listing 
of legislative deference as the foremost principle guiding consideration of the 
proportionality of a particular sentence reflects the preeminence of this factor 
in Supreme Court case law on the topic.51 
Principle Two: “[T]he Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of 
any one penological theory.”52  Justice Kennedy argued that there is no 
preference within the Constitution for retribution or deterrence, for example, 
nor for mandatory or discretionary laws.53 
Principle Three: “[M]arked divergences both in underlying theories of 
sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often 
beneficial, result of the federal structure.”54  Thus, it is inevitable that certain 
states will treat their criminals more harshly than others.55 
Principle Four: “[P]roportionality review by federal courts should be 
informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent.’”56  One can 
easily and objectively differentiate capital and non-capital punishment.  It is 
not so easy, however, to objectively differentiate terms of years.  The Court 
noted that the relative lack of objective standards concerning terms of 
imprisonment has meant that “[o]utside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are] 
exceedingly rare.”57 
Principle Five: “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence.  Rather, it forbids only extreme 
sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”58  Principles one 
through four inform and support principle five, Kennedy explained.59 
 
 49. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(“As a moral or political issue [the punishment of offenders] provokes intemperate emotions, 
deeply conflicting interests, and intractable disagreements.” (quoting DAVID GARLAND, 
PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 1 (1990))). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id.; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
290 (1983); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274; Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910). 
 52. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 999–1000. 
 56. Id. at 1000 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274–75). 
 57. Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 289–90). 
 58. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288). 
 59. Id. 
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Bearing in mind those central principles, Justice Kennedy applied a two 
part test to examine whether, as Harmelin challenged, the Michigan 
Legislature violated the Eighth Amendment by passing a sentence that was 
cruel and unusual either because of its gross disproportionality or mandatory 
nature.60  Justice Kennedy concluded that in neither respect was there a 
constitutional violation.61  In part one of the test, he explained that the Court 
must make a threshold determination of whether or not the sentence is grossly 
disproportionate based on the severity of the punishment and the severity of 
the crime.62  If a sentence is found to be grossly disproportionate, the Court 
should then consider the sentencing practices of other jurisdictions for the 
same crime or sentences attendant other crimes within the same jurisdiction.63  
Such a comparison is employed only in the case of a threshold finding of gross 
disproportionality.64 
Justice Kennedy explained that his principles one through four inform and 
support principle five.65  A careful examination of the five principles reveals 
that they are indeed related, and we would add to Justice Kennedy’s comment 
that principles two through five all arise out of the first principle: that the 
fixing of criminal penalties is “properly within the province of legislatures, not 
courts.”66  Indeed, we identify this principle of strong deference to legislatures 
in the question of criminal sentencing policy as the controlling principle in the 
Court’s case-by-case Eighth Amendment analysis of proportionality.  Each of 
Justice Kennedy’s other principles is derivative or supportive of the principle 
of legislative deference: there is no constitutional preference among policies, 
which leaves the choice to the legislature and requires courts to defer to that 
choice; there will be variation in policies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
because different legislatures will make different choices, to which courts will 
defer; the lack of objective factors by which courts could judge proportionality 
makes successful challenges “exceedingly rare,” leaving intact the decision of 
the legislature; and courts applying the Eighth Amendment will defer to 
legislation, which allows widely disparate sentences, forbidding only those 
sentences that are grossly disproportionate. 
Harmelin’s sentence did not pass the threshold finding of gross 
disproportionality.67  While Harmelin’s sentence was the same as that received 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1009. 
 62. Id. at 1005. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
 65. Id. at 1001. 
 66. Id. at 998 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)). 
 67. Id. at 1005. 
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in Solem v. Helm, in which a life sentence without parole was struck down,68 
and indeed is the second most severe sentence that could be imposed on an 
individual, the Court found it permissible in this case because of the severity of 
Harmelin’s offense.69  The Court distinguished the facts of Solem, finding that 
Solem merely wrote a bad check, “one of the most passive felonies a person 
could commit,” whereas Harmelin was found to be in possession of nearly 650 
grams of a controlled and dangerous substance.70  The Court noted: 
From any standpoint, this crime falls in a different category from the relatively 
minor, nonviolent crime at issue in Solem.  Possession, use, and distribution of 
illegal drugs represents “one of the greatest problems affecting the health and 
welfare of our population.” . . . To the contrary, petitioner’s crime threatened 
to cause grave harm to society.71 
Therefore, the Court found that “the Michigan Legislature could with 
reason conclude that the threat posed to the individual and society by 
possession of this large an amount of cocaine—in terms of violence, crime, 
and social displacement—is momentous enough to warrant the deterrence and 
retribution of a life sentence without parole.”72  The Court itself did not find 
that the sentence was proportional, but rather that there were reasonable 
grounds for the Michigan Legislature to conclude that it was.73 
Justice Kennedy next dismissed Harmelin’s challenge to the mandatory 
nature of the sentence.74  He concluded that mandatory sentences do not violate 
the Eighth Amendment because “[i]t is beyond question that the legislature 
‘has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any 
sentencing discretion.’”75  He again distinguished Solem on the grounds that 
the life without parole sentence in that case was the maximum possible 
sentence allowable, not the mandatory sentence imposed.76 
Since Harmelin, the Court has considered the issue of excessive term of 
years sentencing three times: in Ewing v. California77 and Lockyer v. 
Andrade78 in 2003, and in Graham v. Florida in 2010,79 discussed earlier.  
 
 68. 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
 69. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
 70. Id. at 1002 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983)). 
 71. Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)). 
 72. Id. at 1003. 
 73. Id. at 1004. 
 74. Id. at 1006. 
 75. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 78. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
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Ewing and Andrade were decided the same day, both challenging the 
California three strikes law.80  In Ewing, the Court found constitutional a 
sentence of 25 years to life for the theft of three golf clubs.81  In Andrade, the 
Court upheld a sentence of two back-to-back sentences of 25 years for two 
counts of petty theft.82  Both decisions were heavily guided Justice Kennedy’s 
“guiding principles” from Harmelin, specifically with regard to legislative 
deference.  The Ewing Court expressly upheld the application of California’s 
three-strike law to Ewing’s case because “legislatures enacting three strikes 
laws made a deliberate policy choice” and “[t]hough three strikes laws may be 
relatively new, our tradition of deferring to state legislatures in making and 
implementing such important policy decisions is longstanding.”83  In Andrade, 
the Court refused to grant Mr. Andrade’s petition for habeas corpus review of 
his sentence based on the unconstitutionality of the three-strikes law because 
“the governing legal principle [of the cruel and unusual punishment clause] 
gives legislatures broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the 
scope of the proportionality principle.”84 
B. Categorically Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Deference to legislative enactments also plays a central, but less 
determinative role in the Court’s analysis of categorically cruel and unusual 
sentences.  “The analysis begins,” the Court has repeatedly held, “with 
objective indicia of national consensus.”85  The Court recognizes that the 
“clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the 
legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”86  Legislative enactments, as 
evidence of societal values, are the principal starting place for the Court’s 
categorical analysis, but the Court will also bring its own judgments to bear on 
a particular sentence and consider the specific factors: the moral culpability of 
an offender, such as the type of crime committed or the characteristics of the 
offender; the penological justifications of a particular sentence; and 
international consensus.87  The Court has noted that “[i]n accordance with the 
 
 79. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).  Graham was ultimately decided as a categorical challenge to the 
constitutionality of imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile.  Id. at 2034. 
 80. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11, 14 (plurality opinion); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 63, 66. 
 81. 538 U.S. at 30–31 (plurality opinion). 
 82. 538 U.S. at 77. 
 83. 538 U.S. at 24–25 (plurality opinion) (citing a string of cases emphasizing the 
importance of deference). 
 84. 538 U.S. at 76 (“And it was not objectively unreasonable for the California Court of 
Appeal to conclude that these ‘contours’ permitted an affirmance of Andrade’s sentence.”). 
 85. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010). 
 86. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)). 
 87. See id. at 2033; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
317–18; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion); Enmund v. 
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constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains 
our responsibility.’”88 
When the Court considers the proportionality of a particular category of 
sentencing practice, it begins by taking a poll of state legislative enactments.89  
When a majority of legislatures uphold a certain practice, the Court will 
generally uphold the practice as well; when only a minority of legislature 
support a practice, the Court will generally strike it down.90  Rarely has the 
Court strayed from this time-tested deference to legislative enactments.  In 
1989, it upheld the practice of executing the mentally handicapped when a 
majority of jurisdictions did not ban the practice.91  Thirteen years later, 
however, the Court changed its position on the issue because the national 
consensus had changed.92  Justice Stevens began the opinion in Atkins v. 
Virginia, which struck down the practice, by noting that “[b]ecause of their 
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses . . . 
[the mentally retarded] do not act with the level of moral culpability that 
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”93  He then surmised the 
following: 
Presumably for these reasons, in the 13 years since we decided Penry v. 
Lynaugh, the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges have 
deliberated over the question whether the death penalty should ever be 
imposed on a mentally retarded criminal.  The consensus reflected in those 
deliberations informs our answer to the question presented by this case: 
whether such executions are “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited by 
the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.94 
In order to test for such a consensus, Justice Stevens then took stock of the 
number of state legislatures and federal laws that forbade the execution of the 
mentally retarded and found that in fact a majority of States had passed 
legislation forbidding the practice.95  He commented on the importance of the 
legislative enactments to the Court’s decision: 
 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality 
opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 88. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575). 
 89. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 90. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. 
 91. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (“In our view, the two state statutes 
prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the 14 States that have 
rejected capital punishment completely, do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national 
consensus.”), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
 92. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–16. 
 93. Id. at 306. 
 94. Id. at 307 (citation omitted). 
 95. Id. at 314–16. 
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  It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the 
consistency of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that 
anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections 
for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the 
execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States 
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides 
powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as 
categorically less culpable than the average criminal.96 
Similarly, in 1989 the Court upheld capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders because “a majority of the States that permit capital punishment 
authorize it for crimes committed at age 16 or above”97 but rejected it in 2005 
when they found that “30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 
12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, 
by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its 
reach.”98 
In the rare circumstances where the Court has chosen not to follow 
legislative trends and has overturned a particular practice though a majority of 
legislatures still approved it, it has made a point of showing that the sentencing 
practice had grown lifeless.  For example, in Graham, the Court overturned the 
practice of sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to life in prison without 
parole even though a majority of states still had valid legislation approving the 
practice.99  The Graham Court concluded, however, that the sentencing 
practice in question was used in those jurisdictions infrequently, if at all.100  
Thus, the legislation no longer represented the will of the people.101  Though 
not explicitly mentioned in Graham, the Court’s recognition in Atkins that 
legislatures are much more likely to pass laws that further punish criminals as 
opposed to ones that provide for more lenient treatment undoubtedly played a 
role in the Court’s conclusion that inactive legislation was not the strongest 
evidence of national consensus.102  Thus, the Court’s deference to recently 
passed, pro-active legislation is strongest, whereas dated legislation that is no 
longer actively employed still serves as a starting place but will perhaps 
 
 96. Id. at 315–16 (footnote omitted). 
 97. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005). 
 98. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 99. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–26, 2034 app. (2010). 
 100. Id. at 2025 (“Although it is not certain how many of these numerous juvenile offenders 
were eligible for life without parole sentences, the comparison suggests that in proportion to the 
opportunities for its imposition, life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of 
nonhomicide crimes is as rare as other sentencing practices found to be cruel and unusual.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002). 
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receive less deference as an indication of national consensus on a particular 
issue. 
As we have discussed, in assessing the proportionality of either an 
individual sentence or a particular sentencing scheme, legislative deference is a 
central principle.  The Court defers to the legislature’s expertise in policy-
making and judgments in fixing the appropriate number of years of 
incarceration.  The Court further defers to legislatures’ role as representatives 
of the people in imposing a particular sentencing scheme on a class of 
offenders.  The Court assumes that legislators have considered the various 
penological goals of a punishment and agreed that the approved sentence is 
appropriate for either rehabilitating, incapacitating, imposing proper 
retribution, or properly deterring future criminal acts.103 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT AND DEPORTATION AS PUNISHMENT 
A. A Hundred Years of “Civil” Sanction: The Supreme Court and Its 
Challengers 
The Supreme Court has thus far refused to consider, in any substantive 
way, to what extent the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause could act as a limit on deportation proceedings.  For over one hundred 
years, any Eighth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of deportation 
has been summarily dismissed on the grounds that deportation is “purely civil” 
in nature and the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal punishment.104  
In 1893, in the case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that proceedings to expel a noncitizen were civil rather than criminal in nature, 
and that many of the constitutional protections that applied to criminal 
defendants and criminal proceedings—including the Eighth Amendment—
were therefore not applicable to deportation.105  The Court held that: 
[D]eportation is not a punishment for crime. . . . It is but a method of enforcing 
the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the 
conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation . . . 
has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. . . . [T]he 
provisions of the Constitution . . . prohibiting . . . cruel and unusual 
punishments, have no application.106 
Though Fong Yue Ting did not involve deportation related to criminal 
behavior (as no such provisions existed at that time), its principle that 
 
 103. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30. 
 104. See, e.g., Bassett v. INS, 581 F.2d 1385, 1387–1388 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing a string of 
cases rejecting the Eighth Amendment challenge to deportation and noting that “every other 
appellate court facing the issue has rejected its application to [deportation] proceedings”). 
 105. 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
 106. Id. 
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deportation proceedings are purely civil in nature was relied on by the 
Supreme Court for over a century to summarily dismiss claims that the Eighth 
Amendment and other constitutional protections due to criminal defendants 
should apply in deportation proceedings.107  Though the Court did not again 
directly address the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to deportation, it 
consistently and summarily refused to allow other criminal-style constitutional 
protections, in most cases simply stating that the proceedings were civil and 
citing Fong Yue Ting and its progeny.  For example, over the course of the 
century, the Court relied on Fong Yue Ting to dismiss claims based on the Ex 
Post Facto Clause,108 the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination,109 and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure.110 
It is important to note, however, that there has been a consistent 
counterpoint to this chorus of reliance on Fong Yue Ting’s civil versus criminal 
distinction to deny constitutional protections, beginning with the powerful 
dissents of Justices Brewer, Field, and Fuller in Fong Yue Ting itself.111  All 
three Justices, referring to the severe hardships imposed by deportation, would 
have held that deportation was punishment and merited the constitutional 
protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments.112  In the 
words of Justice Brewer: 
 
 107. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts 
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1908–09 (2000) (discussing 
the important conceptual distinction between deportability grounds based on principles of 
extended border control and on post-entry conduct). 
 108. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (refusing to apply the prohibition on 
ex post facto laws to a deportation law because it held that deportation was not a punishment for 
crime).  In 1952, the Court again refused to find that the Ex Post Facto Clause had been violated 
and upheld the deportation of a noncitizen who had become a member of the Communist Party on 
the grounds that “[t]he inhibition against the passage of an ex post facto law by Congress . . . 
applies only to criminal laws . . . and not to a deportation act like this.”  Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952) (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924)). 
 109. See Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (refusing to apply the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination in deportation because the proceeding was “not 
a criminal one”). 
 110. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not ordinarily justify the 
suppression of evidence in deportation proceedings, referencing Fong Yue Ting and simply 
stating that “[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action” and that “[c]onsistent with the 
civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do 
not apply in a deportation hearing”); see also Pauw, supra note 15, at 308 n.9 (citing like 
treatment by lower courts). 
 111. 149 U.S. at 732 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 
(Fuller, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 740–41 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 748–49 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 763 
(Fuller, J., dissenting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
28 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI:11 
  But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that 
deportation is punishment.  Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away 
from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent 
across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most 
severe and cruel.113 
Interestingly, in addition to recognizing the hardships caused by 
deportation, the dissenters relied strongly on the fact that the noncitizens 
before the Court were legally present in the country,114 a point that mirrors the 
circumstances of the many lawful permanent residents currently facing 
deportation for crimes.  On the question of the proportionality of the sanction 
in the context of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Field stated: 
  The punishment is beyond all reason in its severity.  It is out of all 
proportion to the alleged offense.  It is cruel and unusual.  As to its cruelty, 
nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s residence, 
and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and business there 
contracted.115 
The passionate dissents from Fong Yue Ting have echoed through the 
subsequent century in the voices of a steady stream of dissenting Justices, 
some of whom have maintained that deportation is punishment and therefore 
should have all the protections attendant the imposition of criminal punishment 
and some of whom have taken the position that constitutional protections are 
the responsibility of the government where important liberty interests are at 
stake, regardless of whether a proceeding is civil or criminal.116  For example, 
the various dissenters in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza all took the position that the 
civil nature of deportation proceedings was no reason not to apply the Fourth 
Amendment in full force, because the government’s agents had the same 
 
 113. Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  Justice Brewer goes on to quote James Madison on 
the banishment of aliens: 
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited as the asylum 
most auspicious to his happiness—a country where he may have formed the most tender 
connections, where he may have invested his entire property, and acquired property of the 
real and permanent, as well as the movable and temporary kind, where he enjoys, under 
the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal security and personal liberty than he 
can elsewhere hope for, if, moreover, in the execution of the sentence against him he is to 
be exposed, not only to the ordinary dangers of the sea, but to the peculiar casualties 
incident to a crisis of war and of unusual licentiousness on that element, and possibly to 
vindictive purposes, which his immigration itself may have provoked—if a banishment of 
this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult 
to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied. 
Id. at 740–41 (quoting James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 555 (1836)). 
 114. Id. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 759. 
 116. See Pauw, supra note 15, at 308 n.8 (detailing these dissenting opinions). 
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obligation to respect an individual’s right to be free of unreasonable search and 
seizure, regardless of whether they were investigating crime or civil 
immigration violations.117  In his dissent in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Justice 
Douglas took a position in support of constitutional protections for those facing 
deportation because of the important liberty interests at stake: 
Unless [resident aliens] are free from arbitrary banishment, the “liberty” they 
enjoy while they live here is indeed illusory.  Banishment is punishment in the 
practical sense.  It may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life 
worth while.  Those who have their roots here have an important stake in this 
country.118 
In addition, a lively scholarly conversation has repeatedly questioned the 
Court’s characterization of deportation as purely civil and the appropriateness 
of foregoing constitutional protections on that basis.119  Nonetheless, the 
dominant and controlling case law of the Court has consistently held that 
constitutional protections due to criminal defendants generally are not 
applicable in deportation proceedings strictly because those proceedings are 
civil.120  Only a handful of scholars have directly addressed criminal 
 
 117. E.g., 468 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Government of the 
United States bears an obligation to obey the Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not lifted 
simply because the law enforcement officers were agents of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, nor because the evidence obtained by those officers was to be used in civil deportation 
proceedings.”). 
 118. 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 119. See Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British 
Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 
116 (1999); Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation: Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34–35 (1978); Kanstroom, 
supra note 107, at 1893–94; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); 
Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to 
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
289, 316–20 (2008); Lisa Mendel, Note, The Court’s Failure to Recognize Deportation as 
Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 205, 
216–17 (2000); Pauw, supra note 15, at 313; Michelle Rae Pinzon, Note, Was the Supreme Court 
Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. 
INT’L L. REV. 29, 32 (2003); Gregory L. Ryan, Distinguishing Fong Yue Ting: Why the Inclusion 
of Perjury as an Aggravated Felony Subjecting Legal Aliens to Deportation Under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Violates the Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 989, 1010–13 (1997); Lupe S. Salinas, Note, Deportations, Removals and the 1996 
Immigration Acts: A Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 245, 261–72 
(2004); Ethan Venner Torrey, “The Dignity of Crimes”: Judicial Removal of Aliens and the 
Civil-Criminal Distinction, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187, 188, 206 (1999); Immigration 
Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1386 (1983). 
 120. E.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038; Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594–95. 
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deportation as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.121  
The wealth of supporting scholarly research on the civil versus criminal nature 
of deportation and the relative lack of attention to the Eighth Amendment as a 
tool to challenge disproportionate deportation make this an area ripe for 
examination, made even more so by the Supreme Court’s recent precedent-
bending decisions in Padilla and Graham. 
B. The Immigration Consequences for Crime 
When discussing the relationships and interactions between criminal and 
immigration law, it is important to recognize two things.  One is that the lives 
of tens of thousands of our country’s citizens and residents—noncitizen 
defendants and their family members, many of whom are U.S. citizens—are 
completely and irrevocably upended each year by the deportation of lawful 
residents for relatively minor criminal convictions.122  The other is that the 
structure and operation of our immigration laws with regard to those who 
commit criminal offenses is by no means intuitively logical, fair, or even 
consistent with the way our criminal law treats those same individuals.  In fact, 
quite the opposite is often true.  For example, a criminal sentencing judge will 
take into account the circumstances of a particular case and may completely 
suspend the sentence of an individual for a first-time theft offense.  That 
individual, though she spends no time at all in jail on the theft charge, may 
nonetheless find herself categorized as an “aggravated felon” under 
immigration laws.123  As such, she will be subject to mandatory detention and 
face automatic deportation solely because of the misdemeanor theft charge, 
regardless of how long she has been a permanent resident or how deep her ties 
are in the United States.  Because such outcomes are so counter-intuitive—and 
so common—it is important to ground any discussion of criminal deportation 
in a basic understanding of how immigration law actually operates in the face 
 
 121. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 18, at 1662; Ryan, supra note 119, at 1035–37.  See also the 
writings of Third Circuit Judge H. Lee Sarokin, who has long “rail[ed] against” the unjust 
practice of deporting long-time residents with ties to the country for minor crimes.  H. Lee 
Sarokin, When Does Deportation Become Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 31, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/when-does-depor 
tation-bec_b_520972.html; H. Lee Sarokin, Debunking the Myth that Deportation Is not 
Punishment, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2009, 4:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
judge-h-lee-sarokin/debunking-the-myth-that-d_b_321329.html. 
 122. See UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW & UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS SCH. OF LAW, IN 
THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST? THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT 
TO DEPORTATION 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/news/images/childsbestin 
terest.pdf; Michael Falcone, 100,000 Parents of Citizens Were Deported over 10 Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A16. 
 123. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”).  Deportation consequences thus often result 
from the offense’s classification as an “aggravated felony”. 
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of criminal convictions.  Justice Stevens did just this in the Padilla decision, 
first tracing the history and operation of the immigration law of convictions in 
order to ground the decision’s analysis and conclusions in that reality.124 
Removal is imposed under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(hereinafter “INA”) as a sanction for an extremely wide range of criminal 
offenses, including serious crimes,125 but also a number of lesser offenses.126  
The consequences of these offenses depend on which category the offense falls 
within, as those categories are defined by the INA.  The most widely 
prosecuted categories of offenses are drug offenses127 and those identified as 
“crimes involving moral turpitude”128 and “aggravated felonies”.129  Each of 
these categories, in turn, includes a broad range of offenses. 
With regard to drug offenses, the INA provides that an individual is 
removable if convicted of any offense “relating to a controlled substance.”130  
This provision has been interpreted broadly to include any drug offense from 
simple possession to offenses relating to drug kingpins.131  It also includes 
simple possession of drug paraphernalia.132 
The category of crimes involving moral turpitude is not defined by the 
INA, but it has been defined in the case law as any crime involving conduct 
that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of 
morality” or “intrinsically wrong.”133  This category has been found to include 
everything from fairly standard “crimes involving moral turpitude,” such as 
crimes committed with an intent to do bodily harm, sex offenses, and drug 
 
 124. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478–80 (2010). 
 125. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (murder); id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (aggravated assault); id. § 
1227(a)(2)(C) (firearm offenses); id. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (domestic violence); id. § 1101(a)(43)(B) 
(drug trafficking). 
 126. E.g., id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv) (high speed flight); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft); id. § 
1101(a)(43)(M) (fraud); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (possession of drug paraphernalia); id. § 
1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (child neglect or abuse); id. § 1101(a)(43)(P) (document fraud); id. § 
1101(a)(43)(S) (perjury); id. § 1101(a)(43)(Q) (failure to appear for a criminal trial). 
 127. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
 128. Id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 129. Id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felonies with deportation consequences under § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). 
 130. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
 131. See In re Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I. & N. Dec. 613, 616 (B.I.A. 1988) (“It is evident to 
us . . . that Congress intended to expand rather than limit the power of the Government to curtail 
drug abuse through the immigration laws. . . . In the case before us, the respondent has admitted 
to being twice convicted for the crime of use and being under the influence of phencyclidine.  
Phencyclidine is listed as a controlled substance . . . . [T]he respondent falls within the purview of 
the amended language . . . of the Act, which refers to convictions ‘relating to a controlled 
substance.’” (citation omitted)). 
 132. See Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 133. In re Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (B.I.A. 1994), aff’d, 72 F.3d 571 (8th. Cir. 
1995). 
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trafficking, to less serious offenses, like writing bad checks,134 bootlegging,135 
petty theft,136 student loan fraud,137 making false statements,138 and misuse of a 
Social Security card.139  An individual, even if she is a permanent resident, can 
be removable for a crime involving moral turpitude if it is committed within 
five years of her admission to the United States140 or if she is convicted of two 
such crimes, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal conduct, at any 
time.141 
Depending on her underlying immigration status and how long she has 
held that status, a person who is removable for simple possession of a 
controlled substance or a crime involving moral turpitude may or may not 
qualify for some form of relief from deportation, such as cancellation of 
removal for lawful permanent residents.142  This possible eligibility for relief 
from removal applies also to permanent residents convicted of other removable 
offenses, such as domestic violence offenses143 or illegal firearms 
possession.144 
However, since 1996, these categories of offenses for which relief from 
deportation is available have been largely eclipsed by the greatly expanded 
category of “aggravated felonies,”145 which render an individual automatically 
removable146 and disqualify her from eligibility for cancellation of removal147 
and virtually every other form of relief available in immigration 
proceedings.148  In addition to automatic deportation, someone deported for an 
 
 134. Ijoma v. INS, 875 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Neb. 1995), aff’d, 76 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 91–92 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d 
328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); In re Logan, 17 I. & N. Dec. 367, 368 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 135. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951); Maita v. Haff, 116 F.2d 337, 337 (9th 
Cir. 1940). 
 136. Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 137. Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 138. Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432, 437–38 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 139. Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2009); Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 
388, 393 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 140. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
 141. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 142. Id. § 1229b(a) (permitting cancellation of removal to aliens with no aggravated felonies 
who are legal permanent residents of the United States for a minimum of five years or who have 
continuously resided in the United States in a lawful presence for seven years). 
 143. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E). 
 144. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C). 
 145. Id. § 1101(a)(43). 
 146. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (“Any alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively 
presumed to be deportable from the United States.” (emphasis added)). 
 147. Id. § 1101(f)(8); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). 
 148. Id. § 1229b(a)(3).  Individuals with these convictions are specifically barred from 
seeking relief, such as cancellation of removal for individuals who are not legal permanent 
residents, id. § 1229b(b)(1), special cancellation of removal for Central Americans under the 
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aggravated felony conviction is permanently barred from reentering the 
country,149 which makes removal for an aggravated felony a kind of life 
banishment without the possibility of parole.  This most severe of all 
immigration sanctions might indeed be appropriate for the most serious 
criminal offenses and for those noncitizens with few community ties, but the 
current legal framework makes the sanction automatic for a stunningly broad 
range of offenses—some relatively quite minor—and takes no account of the 
individual’s underlying immigration status or ties to the United States.  As a 
result, there is no distinction between the sanction automatically imposed on 
someone who entered the country very recently and illegally and that imposed 
on a long term permanent resident with U.S citizen children and significant 
history in and ties to the community.  Likewise, there is no distinction between 
the sanction for someone convicted of murder and someone convicted of 
failing to appear in court to answer a criminal charge that carries a potential 
two year sentence.150  Both are equally subject to the full weight of automatic 
and permanent deportation that falls on the aggravated felony category.  Other 
offenses that can be categorized as aggravated felonies include receipt of stolen 
property, petty theft, simple assault, possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance, second degree burglary, accessory after the fact, and 
perjury, as well as attempts or conspiracies to commit any of these offenses.151  
 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66 (2011), voluntary 
departure, 8 U.S.C.  § 1229c(a)(1), relief under the battered spouse provisions of the Violence 
Against Women Act, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.65(d)(3), and, in most cases, temporary protected status, id. 
§ 1244.4.  They are even barred from humanitarian relief from persecution in the form of asylum, 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), and in many circumstances where removal would threaten the safety 
of the alien, the more limited withholding of removal as well, id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  The only 
possible relief remaining for someone convicted of an aggravated felony requires her to 
demonstrate that her “life or freedom would be threatened,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(C), or that her 
government would subject her to torture if she were deported, 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–18.   See 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  Obviously, very few individuals facing 
removal can meet these standards. 
 149. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(A) permanently prohibits admission to the 
United States for any alien who has been ordered deported at the end of removal proceedings and 
has been convicted of an aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). 
 150. Both offenses are defined as an aggravated felony within the meaning of immigration 
law.  Id. §§ 1011(a)(43)(A), 1101(a)(43)(T). 
 151. Id. § 1101(a)(43) (2006) (defining aggravated felonies).  Some of these offenses, such as 
theft, burglary, and crimes of violence, are classified as aggravated felonies when the conviction 
is accompanied by a sentence of one year or more.  Id. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1101(a)(43)(G).  This 
includes any sentence that may have been suspended by the criminal court, another factor that 
makes immigration consequences counterintuitive for those accustomed to the criminal justice 
system.  Id. § 1101(a)(48)(B).  For an overview of many convictions categorized as aggravated 
felonies and convictions that fall into other removable categories, see MAUREEN A. SWEENEY ET 
AL., ABBREVIATED CHART FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTITIONERS OF THE IMMIGRATION 
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Because of the broad reach of the aggravated felony category and the severe 
and automatic nature of its consequences, many criminal convictions, which 
may not seem like “serious” offenses to those in the criminal justice system, 
lead automatically to deportation for permanent residents and other 
noncitizens.152 
C. Deportation as Punishment in Padilla v. Kentucky 
When understood in the context of the hundred-year-long debate over 
whether deportation can constitute punishment and the current severity and 
inflexibility of deportation for crimes, Padilla’s statement that “as a matter of 
federal law, deportation is an integral part . . . of the penalty that may be 
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes” is 
indeed profound.153  While Justice Stevens was careful to acknowledge that 
deportation is in fact still “civil in nature,” such a statement rings hollow in 
light of the Court’s extended discussion of the extent to which criminal 
convictions and deportation have become “intimately related” and 
“enmeshed.”154  In Parts I and II of the Padilla opinion, Justice Stevens posited 
that deportation is different today than it was when the civil versus criminal 
distinction was first made and it is uniquely different from a host of other 
“collateral” consequences for which criminal procedural protections are 
excluded.155 
Justice Stevens begins Part I of the opinion by stating, “[t]he landscape of 
federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the past 90 years.”156  
This change, he explained, has taken the United States from a time of 
“unimpeded immigration” to one where the “‘drastic measure’ of deportation 
or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens 
convicted of crimes.”157  In the era of Fong Yue Ting there was no such thing 
as a post-entry ground of deportability.158  One could only be denied entry into 
the United States for demonstrating some reprehensible characteristic; the 
government did not regulate behavior after an immigrant was allowed to 
enter.159 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS UNDER MARYLAND STATE LAW (2011), available 
at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/Msweeney/ImmigrationConsequencesChart.pdf. 
 152. For a more in-depth history of the expansion of the aggravated felony and other criminal 
deportation provisions, see Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of 
Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 63–67 (2010). 
 153. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
 154. Id. at 1481. 
 155. Id. at 1478–82. 
 156. Id. at 1478. 
 157. Id. (citations omitted). 
 158. See  Kanstroom, supra note 107, at 1901. 
 159. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
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Justice Stevens explained that the concept of deportation based on post-
entry behavior was first introduced with the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1917.160  The Act made deportable certain aliens who committed a crime 
involving moral turpitude.161  The Act, however, “also included a critically 
important procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust deportation”—
The Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation, also referred to as 
JRAD.162  Rather than being a mere recommendation, however, the JRAD 
“had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was 
‘consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive 
authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a 
basis for deportation.’”163  Therefore, even though the classes of deportable 
aliens continued to expand, sentencing judges retained the right to “ameliorate 
unjust results on a case-by-case basis.”164 
Justice Stevens wrapped up Part I by explaining that sentencing judges no 
longer have that right to recommend against deportation; Congress eliminated 
that right completely in 1990, and later eliminated the Attorney General’s right 
to grant discretionary relief from deportation for anyone with an aggravated 
felony conviction.165  The result is that deportation is now an entirely 
automatic consequence for many crimes.  Thus, he concludes, “[t]hese changes 
confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral 
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be 
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”166 
In Part II of the Padilla opinion, Justice Stevens explained why deportation 
as a consequence of a crime is within the ambit of Strickland v. Washington’s 
requirement that criminal counsel be competent.167  The Kentucky Supreme 
Court, following numerous other courts, had held that a defense counsel’s 
failure to advise a defendant of a possible consequence of deportation cannot 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because immigration is a collateral 
rather than direct consequence of a crime, and therefore Strickland does not 
apply.168  Justice Stevens reversed the Kentucky decision, pointing out that 
 
 160. See id. at 1479. 
 161. Id.  Deportability for crimes involving moral turpitude was the same in 1917 as it is 
today: Anyone who commits such an offense within five years of entry and receives a sentence of 
one year or more is deportable, as is anyone who commits two or more such crimes at any time 
after admission.  Compare id. (describing original deportability framework under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of1917), with 8 U.S.C §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
 162. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479. 
 163. Id. (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1480. 
 166. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 167. Id. at 1481–82. 
 168. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. 
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because of the changes to the nature of deportation referenced in Part I, the 
direct versus collateral distinction was “ill-suited” to deportation: 
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless 
intimately related to the criminal process.  Our law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century.  And, 
importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly 
an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.  Thus, we find it 
“most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation 
context.169 
Justice Stevens further observed that the Court has never held that the 
direct/collateral distinction was relevant to the scope of Strickland’s 
requirements.170  Thus, he concluded that “advice regarding deportation is not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”171  Justice Stevens concluded 
the opinion of the Court by holding that Mr. Padilla’s counsel did fail to give 
effective assistance, not only in that he affirmatively misadvised Mr. Padilla 
but also to the extent that he failed to offer advice.172  Justice Stevens 
remanded the case for consideration as to whether Mr. Padilla was prejudiced 
by the ineffective assistance of counsel, the second prong of the Strickland 
analysis.173 
Taking Justice Stevens at his word that deportation is indeed part of a 
criminal penalty and that punishment is indeed at times “harsh” and “severe,” 
we turn now to examine whether the Court’s established Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence might support the position that certain cases of criminal 
deportation may be disproportionate and amount to cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
III.  DISPROPORTIONATE DEPORTATION AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Our review of the jurisprudence of both categorical and individual Eighth 
Amendment challenges to sentencing demonstrates that the Court gives 
extremely broad deference to legislative determinations of what sentences are 
appropriate and proportionate.  It is clear from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
in Harmelin and the Court’s subsequent cases that the Court considers the 
power to determine sentences or sentencing ranges a proper exercise of the 
legislature’s policy-making function to which the Court will give great 
deference.174  Justice Kennedy began his explication of the principles guiding 
 
 169. Id. (citations omitted). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1482. 
 172. Id. at 1486–87. 
 173. Id. at 1487. 
 174. See supra Part I.A. 
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proportionality review with the “first” principle, that of legislative 
deference.175  Indeed, as we have seen, all of his five principles are grounded in 
or lead to strong deference to the legislative prerogative and expertise in 
policymaking.176  He goes on to affirm that responsibility for making 
sentencing policy judgments lies squarely with the legislature, noting, 
“[w]hatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, 
whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, . . . these are peculiarly 
questions of legislative policy.”177  It is not for a reviewing court to second-
guess the wisdom of the legislature’s considered judgment in these complex 
questions of the types and limits of punishment for crimes.178  It is for precisely 
this reason that the Eighth Amendment does not require strict congruence 
between crime and sentence, despite its guiding precept of proportionality,179 
but rather “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ 
to the crime.”180 
There can be no doubt that the Court has indeed deferred substantially to 
legislatures in its review of sentencing schemes, a deference that has to a large 
extent eviscerated the Eighth Amendment’s ability to support challenges to the 
proportionality of individual criminal sentences.  Of most direct relevance for 
our purposes are the cases addressing state “three-strike” laws and mandatory 
minimums, sentences that are applied automatically based on the offense and 
the individual’s criminal history, without regard to discretionary factors 
relating to the actual conduct of the individual offender.181  The majority in 
Harmelin specifically upheld the legislature’s power to impose mandatory 
sentences and rejected an argument that individual (non-death) sentences had 
to be individualized according to the trial court’s determination of whether the 
punishment was appropriate to the case.182  It is furthermore clear in Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence that the Court’s deference to the severe, mandatory 
penalty was based on the premise that the legislature, the body best suited to 
making policy determinations, had already considered and made the 
 
 175. Michigan v. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 998–99 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment). 
 176. See supra Part I.A. 
 177. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)). 
 178. See id. at 999. 
 179. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366–67 (1910). 
 180. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 
271 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U.S. at 
371. 
 181. See discussion supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text. 
 182. 501 U.S. at 996 (“We have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at 
capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further.”). 
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“substantive penological judgment” that the sentence was supported by the 
genuine, reasonable penological concerns of retribution and deterrence.183  In 
three-strikes cases, the Court has deferred to the legislature’s judgment that the 
threat of recidivism justified the goals of deterring and incapacitating repeat 
offenders through increased sentences and refused to sit as a “superlegislature” 
to revisit that judgment.184  As we have seen, this deference has led to the 
upholding of sentences that are severe indeed in light of the actual 
circumstances of the offenses. 
In categorical proportionality challenges, deference to the legislature has 
been somewhat more muted than in term-of-years challenges, as the Court sees 
a stronger role for itself in judging the appropriateness of the uniquely severe 
and irrevocable sanction of death and, more recently, life without parole for 
juveniles.  However, it is clear that the existence of legislation is a powerful 
factor in the Court’s assessment of whether there is a national consensus in 
favor of or opposed to a particular punishment, and the Court finds evidence of 
such policy-based legislative decision-making to be the most reliable objective 
evidence of national values, and thus the starting point for its analysis.185 
However, in order for either of these manifestations of legislative 
deference to make sense as a key determinant of proportionality analysis, there 
must be evidence that the legislature has indeed made a substantive 
penological judgment as to the appropriateness of a sentence or sentencing 
scheme.  While he made clear that it was not the role of the judiciary to 
second-guess the legislature’s judgment, Justice Kennedy in Harmelin also 
clearly understood that such substantive consideration and judgment was 
essential at some point: “The efficacy of any sentencing system cannot be 
assessed absent agreement on the purposes and objectives of the penal 
system.”186  In other words, it is clear that there must be at least some 
reasonable penological rationale for a sentencing system, and that someone 
must have articulated this and made a judgment as to its efficacy.  While the 
Court has often refused to engage in a re-evaluation of a system’s efficacy, it 
has refused to do so precisely because the legislature has already done an 
initial evaluation of the relationship between the scheme and genuine 
penological goals. 
Likewise, in its categorical analysis in Graham, the Court made clear that 
the simple fact that a sentencing law is on the books does not mean that the 
legislature has necessarily fully considered its penological merits and, 
 
 183. Id. at 998, 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he 
Michigan Legislature could with reason conclude that the threat posed . . . is momentous enough 
to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole.” (emphasis added)). 
 184. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 185. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–23 (2010). 
 186. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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importantly, that the deference due such laws depends upon this 
consideration.187  In its review of state laws which allow a life sentence 
without parole for juveniles, the Court speculated that the states that authorize 
the transfer of juveniles to adult court may not have realized or intended for 
those juveniles to be exposed to the imposition of a life sentence without 
parole.188  The Court concluded that the simple fact that a sentencing law or 
practice exists “does not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through 
deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”189  Without that 
endorsement, the Court was unwilling to defer to such statutory schemes, 
despite the fact that they were on the books in thirty-seven states.190 
Herein lies a fundamental problem with the INA’s scheme of deportation 
for crimes: that it operates, yet has never been evaluated by Congress or the 
judiciary, as a sentencing scheme.  Padilla recognized the imposition of 
deportation for criminal conduct as part of the penalty for the commission of a 
crime, but it was not considered to be so when Congress passed the various 
provisions that make up the criminal deportation scheme.  Rather, it was 
passed as part of the nation’s immigration laws, which the courts had been 
specifically exempting from constitutional criminal protections for a century 
on the grounds that they were civil and not criminal.  Prior to Padilla, there 
was no expectation that any deportation grounds had to be evaluated or 
justified penologically, so they never were.  While Congress did indeed pass 
the criminal deportation provisions, it never made a substantive penological 
judgment as to their appropriateness as a scheme for criminal sentencing.  
Thus, the rationale in favor of giving broad legislative deference to statutory 
provisions—that the legislature has already given “deliberate, express, and full 
legislative consideration” to imposing deportation as part of a criminal 
penalty191—would be without foundation, and the deference that would 
consequently be due the provisions under ordinary Eighth Amendment law, in 
the form of the gross disproportionality standard and a presumption that 
legislation reflects the values of the nation regarding sentencing policy, is not 
properly applicable in the case of deportation for crimes. 
Without the limits imposed by the strong legislative deference of ordinary 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, courts should apply a robust standard of 
proportionality to deportation when it is imposed as part of a criminal penalty.  
This review should consist of the same balancing factors identified by the 
courts in Eighth Amendment review: the severity of the crime, the severity of 
the penalty, and relevant characteristics of the offender.  In the context of 
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deportation, the latter would include a consideration of the individual’s 
immigration status, as well as her history and ties to the community.  As the 
first decision-makers to consider the appropriateness of imposing deportation 
as part of the criminal penalty, courts should not hesitate to make the 
substantive penological judgment as to the proportionality of that sanction. 
There is little doubt that many deportations that are mandated or triggered 
by our current immigration law would undoubtedly fail to meet a standard that 
requires simple proportionality, and this reading of the Eighth Amendment 
could protect thousands of individuals and their families from suffering the 
disproportionate penalty of deportation for relatively minor offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
Our immigration law has lost any semblance of concern for proportionality 
in how it imposes deportation for crimes.  In the past decades, and especially 
since 1996, the United States has deported tens of thousands of individuals—
including tens of thousands of long-term permanent residents—because of 
criminal convictions.192  The provisions of the immigration law that allow such 
deportations are in many cases mandatory, permitting no relief from the 
sanction of removal and additionally prohibiting the individual from ever 
returning to the United States.  While such provisions might be justified for the 
most serious of criminal offenses, their current sweep includes a very large 
number of non-violent and relatively minor crimes which are classified as 
“aggravated felonies,” including such offenses as petty theft with a one year 
suspended sentence and failure to appear in court on criminal charges with a 
potential two year sentence.193  In many of these cases, the penalty of 
deportation seems clearly disproportionate to the offense, especially for 
individuals who stand to permanently lose lawful resident status in the United 
States. 
We have taken the Supreme Court at its word in Padilla v. Kentucky and 
consider removal that is triggered solely by a criminal conviction to be “part of 
the penalty” for criminal activity.194  We have also considered that such 
 
 192. In 2011 alone, Immigration and Customs Enforcement removed 215,698 persons 
convicted of felonies or misdemeanors, a record-high number for the agency.  See Press Release, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2011: ICE Announces Year-End Removal 
Number, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities Including Threats to Public Safety and National 
Security, (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washington 
dc.htm.  Specific information on annual removal figures is made available annually by the 
Department of Homeland Security in the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.  See Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/pub 
lications/yearbook.shtmhttp://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm (providing 
an archive of removal statistics) (last updated Oct. 12, 2011). 
 193. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (2006) (defining crimes which constitute an “aggravated felony”). 
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deportation may likely come within the reach of the Eighth Amendment’s 
principle that punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportionate to 
the offense for which it is imposed, and looked at how Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence might be applied to deportation that is imposed as a criminal 
sanction.  Because Congress has never substantively evaluated criminal 
deportation provisions as sentencing policy, we argue that courts should apply 
the Eighth Amendment to those provisions in the form of a simple 
proportionality standard, directly considering the severity of the offense, the 
severity of the penalty, and relevant characteristics of the offender regarding 
culpability.  One response to this analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s 
application to removal for crimes is for courts to step in, as we have argued, 
and review the proportionality of removal as a criminal sanction.  This could 
take the form of the review of individual cases in which deportation may be 
disproportionate to the offense.  It might also take the form of consideration of 
categorical challenges to certain aspects of the criminal removal scheme at 
large, such as the “aggravated felony” provisions and their inclusion of 
manifestly minor offenses.  The latter is particularly intriguing because of the 
aggravated felony provisions’ explicit prohibition on any discretionary relief 
from removal that might otherwise act as a mechanism to correct for 
disproportionate results. 
Alternatively, Congress could take up the task of substantively considering 
the penological value and proportionality of deportation as a sanction for all of 
the many criminal offenses by which it can be triggered in current law.  If 
Congress were to carry out such a substantive review, thereafter the usual 
Eighth Amendment standards would apply, and deportation would only be 
prohibited if it were grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense.  To be 
meaningful, however, this review would have to be far-reaching and would 
have to seriously consider the penological rationale for imposing deportation 
for the many minor offenses currently included in the law.  At the least, we 
think this review would require a reworking of the aggravated felony definition 
to limit its severe and automatic sanctions to the most serious of crimes and, 
ideally, the inclusion of mechanisms to allow criminal sentencing judges to 
preclude the sanction of removal and immigration judges to cancel removal 
when it would be disproportionate to the underlying offense.195 
 
 195. Congress could also take immigration consequences seriously as part of criminal 
punishment and develop a system of graduated immigration-related penalties to parallel graduated 
criminal penalties.  Juliet Stumpf has proposed a system of graduated immigration penalties that 
could include an extension of the waiting period for eligibility to naturalize, a finding and stay of 
removal analogous to a suspended sentence, fines, or a period of probation in which any further 
violation would result in deportation.  See Juliet P. Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 264 (2006). 
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The current paralysis of Congress with regard to enacting substantive 
immigration legislation leads us to believe, however, that major revisions to 
our immigration statutes are not on the horizon.  Until such time as that 
changes, long-term permanent residents and other noncitizens will likely 
continue to have to look to the courts to protect them from the disproportionate 
sanction of deportation for minor crimes.  In the wake of Padilla, the Eighth 
Amendment gives them a tool to do just that. 
 
